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Several studies have examined the determinants of training in developing countries but only 
few have paid attention to the potential importance of international standards such as ISO 
9000 or ISO 14000 on the firm’s training decision.  This paper examines training 
determinants using recent employer surveys for four developing countries, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Morocco and Nicaragua.  We find that ISO certification status is an important 
determinant of training, even after controlling for other characteristics such as workers’ 
formal schooling, firm size, industry and foreign ownership.  This points towards the 
importance of product quality and production standards for firm training.  The paper also 
discusses policy implications related to the findings and provides directions for further 
research.      
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1.  Introduction 
 
The relevance of human capital for economic growth and development has long been 
recognized in economic theory
1.  Attention over human capital increased in the 1950s as 
development theories shifted away from their previous focus in physical capital and 
infrastructure.  In the current context of a globalized economy where knowledge is 
considered a major driver of growth (Romer, 1989), human capital becomes a crucial point in 
development strategies and policies.  
  A significant amount of theoretical and empirical work is available on how human 
capital, understood as education and post-schooling training, contributes to economic growth 
by increasing productivity and facilitating the introduction of new technologies of 
production.  When people acquire skills they increase their productivity and become more 
adaptable (Booth and Snower, 1996).  This is a key ability in a world of flexible production 
where tastes and technology are changing rapidly.  Keeping a high level of competitiveness 
depends on large part in the aptitude of firms and its workers to change and innovate.  On the 
other hand, when one worker gains skills, he/she makes other workers more productive 
(Booth and Snower, 1996).  As workplaces become highly integrated and interdependent 
human networks, and teamwork constitutes a pervasive organizational practice, the benefits 
of training gain increasing potential. 
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1 In Adam Smith’s major work The Wealth of Nations, worker’s dexterity is stated as one of the mechanisms 
through which the division of labor raises productivity.    2
  One of the points defining the debates around firm-sponsored training is its 
conception as a privileged instrument for increasing labor market flexibility by providing 
channels that enable workers to adapt to technical change (Goux and Maurin, 2000).  On the 
other hand, there exist polarized positions regarding whether private sector or governments 
are the best providers of training.  The private sector is considered more responsive to market 
forces than governments in many dimensions, but there is disagreement on how good it 
works regarding training.  The diversity of policy arrangements found around the world 
reflects the many different views regarding the interplay of governments and private sector in 
this matter (Booth and Snower, 1996; Arulampalam and Booth, 1997; Tan, 2001).   
Additionally, dissimilar levels of training among countries seem to be associated to their 
share of GDP to research and development, and to their performance in the so-called “high-
tech industries” (OECD, 1999).  Significant amount of research on the determinants of firm-
sponsored training has been carried out in developed countries.  However a remarkable 
scarcity of studies of this kind in developing countries remains a major problem (Colin Xu, 
1998; Tan, 1996).   
This paper addresses this knowledge gap by providing an overview of the 
determinants of firm-sponsored training for five developing countries across three continets 
from original firm-level surveys, namely Ethiopia, Honduras, Indonesia, Morocco and 
Nicaragua.  In so doing, we focus specifically at the potential importance of international 
standards such as ISO 9000 or ISO 14000 on the firm’s training decision, which previously 
have received little to no attention in the literature.  In a globalized world, however, 
international standards may be more important than ever.  Two issues are involved.  First, 
when consumers are exposed to products from a wide range of products from all over the 
world, consumers will likely desire and, maybe even more importantly, be able to demand 
higher and more even product standards.  An example here is the ISO 9000 certification, 
which is a quality management and quality assurance standard.  Second, however, firms now 
act not only on consumers’ demands in terms of products and prices but increasingly in terms 
of consumers’ demands in terms of values more broadly defined.  This includes a notion of 
“green” or “sustainable” consumption, so that modes of production are more environmentally 
friendly and so on.  These issues are, at least partially, addressed by the ISO 14000 standard, 
which involve environmental management systems, environmental auditing, environmental   3
labels and declarations, and environmental performance evaluation.  Again, while there have 
been several studies on the determinants of firms’ training decision for both developed and 
developing economies, the evidence for developing countries is still scarce in relative terms.  
This is certainly true when it comes to the examining the possible impact of international 
standards on the firm’s training decision.   
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section presents an 
overview of the previous evidence on training determinants.  Section three presents the data, 
including descriptive statistics.  A discussion of the methodology of the paper is provided in 
section four, while section five presents the results.  Finally, section six concludes, discusses 
the policy implications of the findings and provides directions for further research.      
2.  Previous Evidence on Training Determinants 
Several factors potentially affect the firm’s training decision.  Among these are the 
education level of workers; the ratio between costs and benefits of training being more 
favorable for people with higher education level.  From the perspective of both employers 
and employees, this means a higher probability of training for people with greater learning 
ability, which can be proxied by the educational level they have attained.  In turn, this raises 
a major public policy issue.  If workers enter the labor force with poor education, they will 
not obtain the training needed to increase their wages.  A high proportion of low educated 
workers will discourage firms from offering good jobs that require higher skills and training.  
At the same time, having only few good jobs available, workers will have little incentive to 
train.  As a consequence, workers may get caught in a cycle of low productivity, low training 
and insufficient skilled jobs, or the “low-skill, bad-job” trap (Snower, 1996).   
  In developed countries of North America and Europe, there is consistent evidence of 
significant higher likelihood of work related training the higher the education level of the 
recipient (Arulampalam and Booth, 1997; Booth, 1991; Van Smoorenburg and Van der 
Velden, 2000; Bartel and Sicherman, 1998; Green, 1993; Lynch and Black, 1995; Veum, 
1995).  For developing countries the results are more diverse.  High impact of education level 
in training likelihood is found in Mexico (Tan and Lopez-Acevedo, 2003; Tan and Batra, 
1996), Thailand (Zeufack, 1998), Malaysia (Tan, 2001; Tan and Batra, 1996), and Colombia 
(Tan and Batra, 1996).  No significant relationship between education level and training was   4
found is Shangai (Ng, forthcoming), and a negative relationship of education with training 
was found in Indonesia (Tan and Batra, 1996).  
  Organization size is another factor that impacts the likelihood of training. Extensive 
empirical work in developed countries shows that larger firms provide more work related 
training than smaller firms (Van Smoorenburg and Van der Velden, 2000; Booth,1993; Goux 
and Maurin, 2000; Veum, 1995; Green, 1993; and Frazis et al, 1995; Lynch and Black, 
1995).  Looking at results from developing countries, a positive relationship has been found 
in Mexico (Tan and Lopez-Acevedo, 2003; Tan and Batra, 1996), Thailand (Zeufack, 1998), 
Malaysia (Tan, 2001), Taiwan, Colombia and Indonesia (Tan and Batra, 1996).  However, no 
significant relationship was found in Shanghai (Ng, forthcoming).  One of the explanations 
for this are the economies of scale that firms find in provision of training when they have 
more employees.  For the case of internal (in-firm) training, the fixed costs of training can be 
spread over a larger number of employees, and for externally provided services, special 
discounts can be arranged based on quantity.  Other explanation for the strong association 
between firm size and training, is the fact that larger firms are more forward looking and/or 
better prepared to face the risks of training (Arulampalam and Booth, 1997).  Larger firms 
are also often subject to more regulations and bureaucracy, therefore offering more training 
to meet safety requirements (Felstead and Green, 1996).  Finally, smaller firms might be less 
inclined to offer training because of their shorter and more uncertain planning horizons, 
which makes them less likely to capture the returns of training (Oi, 1983).  Considering that 
in most countries micro and small enterprises constitute a large proportion of the private 
sector, at least in sharing of employment, this presents important issues regarding the access 
of training for the employees of those companies. 
  The role of trade unions in firm-sponsored training is contested.  Theories support 
two opposing views.  Unions would undermine training opportunities by using their 
monopoly role over labor supply to appropriate a larger proportion of surplus to obtain wages 
increases (Arampalum and Booth, 1997; Booth, 1995).  It is also held that unionized 
establishments will have lower incentive to train workers as a result of opposition to the 
introduction of new skill-intensive technologies that would threaten union jobs 
(Arulampalam and Booth, 1997).   5
  On the other hand, unions may be associated to increased training given that 
cooperation with employers improves workers’ morale and organization, which promotes 
training and increased productivity (Arulampalam and Booth, 1997).  In addition to this, 
unions would encourage firm-sponsored training through their effect on increased tenure 
(lower turnover) (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  Finally, the formal unionized environment 
may encourage firms to establish more sophisticated training systems (Green at al, 1996). 
  Empirical studies lend support to both points of view.  In developed countries studies 
typically find a significant positive impact of unionization over training provision (Booth, 
1991; Veum, 1995; Green et al, 1999).  Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) find disagreement among 
studies looking at the effect of unions in work related training. However, in developing 
countries, evidence from Colombia and Taiwan (Tan and Batra, 1996), Mexico (Tan and 
Lopez-Acevedo, 2003; Tan and Batra, 1996) and Malaysia (Tan, 2001), confirms a positive 
impact of trade unions in the likelihood of firm-sponsored training.  
  The relationship between physical and human capital is another factor that has to be 
considered when assessing the provision of firm-sponsored training.  When workers acquire 
skills they make equipment more productive (Booth and Snower, 1996).  It is not clear how 
investments in human capital relate to the investments in physical capital.  Employers may 
consider investments in physical capital as a substitute for skilled labor, or they may see 
investments in human capital as complements to physical capital investments (Lynch and 
Black, 1995).  Employers that make large investments in physical capital relative to the 
number of workers will be more likely to train those workers in order to assure a higher 
return to that investment (Frazis et al, 1995).  This relationship has been confirmed in a study 
of U.S. firms (Lynch and Black, 1995).  
  Different industries show dissimilar likelihood of training.  Industry differences have 
been found among developed and developing countries  (Booth, 1991; Goux and Maurin, 
2000; Ng, forthcoming).  In OECD countries, workers in finance, insurance and business or 
community, social or personal services have a higher probability of being trained compared 
to other industries (OECD, 1999).  Similarly, Frazis et al (1995) found that financing, 
insurance and real state sectors are more likely to provide training.  These differences might 
be related to the technology intensity of each sector (Lillard and Tan, 1992), the market   6
dynamics they face which might require them to innovate at different rates, and different 
levels of legal and safety requirements they are subject to.   
  Foreign equity of firms may have an impact in training practices.  Multinational 
enterprises have been theorized to have a role in knowledge spillovers through a variety of 
means, training of workers among them (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2001).  Tan and Lopez-
Acevedo (2003) found foreign ownership of firms (<50 percent) to be related to a higher 
probability of training in Mexico than local companies, and Tan and Batra (1996) found this 
same relationship for Taiwan and Malaysia.  However, in the same study, Mexico and 
Indonesia did not show a significant impact of foreign ownership in training.  Given the 
ubiquity of foreign owned enterprises and joint ventures, and the expectation over knowledge 
spillovers for the benefit of recipient developing countries, this is a relevant factor to 
consider.  Interestingly, it is not commonly included in analysis of firm training practices.  
  International trade, proxied by the extent to which a firm exports its products, may be 
a good indicator of training practices.  International trade pushes firms to meet higher 
standards in order to satisfy demanding foreign markets and by presenting them with strong 
local competition from foreign producers.  Empirical work testing the impact of trade shows 
contradictory results, with non-significant impact in Mexico (Tan and Lopez-Acevedo, 2003) 
but significant positive impact in Malaysia (Tan, 2001) and Taiwan (Tan and Batra, 1996). 
Finally, workplace practices, such as just-in-time inventories, worker teams, total 
quality management, benchmarking, etc., may impact the probability of training since they 
require the development of particular skills.  ISO standards are a set of international 
industrial standards defining workplace practices based on consensus agreements among 
national delegations representing a wide range of economic stakeholders - suppliers, 
consumers, and government agencies.  The most widespread ISO certifications are the ISO 
9000, a quality management to improve performance and customer satisfaction, and ISO 
14000, an environmental management certification.  ISO standards encompass specifications 
and criteria for the classification of materials, the manufacture of products, the provision of 
services, testing and analysis of products, and terminology.  
Firms benefit from ISO certification because they obtain a base to develop products 
and services according to specifications that have wide acceptance in their sectors.  Firms 
with ISO certification acquire the international recognition of certain quality of outputs and   7
procedures, which enhances competitiveness in global markets through improved 
productivity and/or financial performance (Corbett et al, 2002; Berthelot, et al, 2003).  ISO 
certification provides firms access to the ISO stock of technological know-how helping them 
to save resources by not having to “reinvent the wheel”.  ISO supports the decision making 
processes regarding application and evaluation of new technologies, provides knowledge 
about regulations and consumer criteria on foreign markets, facilitates transfer of technology, 
and the adaptation of products and services to global requirements.  Specifically for the case 
of ISO 14000, one of the important motivations and benefits of firms to achieve it is the 
enhancement of their corporate image, gaining access to customers that require ISO 
certification, and helping firms to answer to pressure from public and environmental groups 
(Ofori et al, 2002; Berthelot et al, 2003.) 
Achieving ISO certification is supposed to be associated with training since the 
certification requires employee training on what is expected from them and how those 
expectations are to be met.  However, many times firms would adopt new working practices 
but would not train their workers accordingly (Frazis et al, 1995).  Moreover, some studies 
have found that firms see training as one of the problematic aspects of the implementation for 
the ISO standards on the firm, in addition to general costs of implementation, and lack of 
management and employee involvement (Berthelot et al, 2003, Ofori et al, 2000).  
Given the relative scarcity of studies on training practices in developing countries, 
and the increasing relevance of international standards for trade, we want to explore to what 
extent ISO certification has direct impacts on the possibilities of developing the human 
capital of workers.  Despite the seemingly natural association between high performance 
workplace practices and training, very few studies address the specific relationship of ISO 
certification and training.  Only for Mexico, a study on the maquiladora industry finds 
training provision significantly higher in ISO-certified companies, than in the non-certified 
ones (Dowlatshahi and Urias, 2004).  Studies in the US confirm this trend of strong 
association between workplace practices and training (Frazis et al, 1995; Lynch and Black, 
1995).   8
3.  Data and Descriptive Analyses 
The surveys that provide the material for this paper were sponsored and designed by 
the Private Sector Department of the World Bank in order to gather up-to-date information 
regarding productivity and business climate in developing countries. The sample unit was the 
business establishment, defined as the production location, although in this paper we refer to 
them as firms. 
  The surveys are based on face-to-face interviews to managing directors, accountants, 
human resources managers and other relevant company staff.  While sampling design varies 
somewhat across countries, the questionnaires are mostly consistent in terms of the nature of 
questions and their wording.  Table 3.1 provides the sample size
2 and year of data collection 
for each country.  
 
Table 3.1  Overview of Countries, Sample Sizes and Year of Field Work 
Country  Year Field work  Sample size 
Ethiopia 2002  427 
Honduras 2003  450 
Indonesia 2003  713 
Morocco 2000  859 
Nicaragua 2003  452 
 
The selected countries for this paper were chosen based on geographic representation, 
availability and comparability of the data pertinent to the present paper.  In particular, we 
were able to create a comparable set of “core” variables for the five countries shown in Table 
3.1.  These five countries therefore comprise the analysis sample for this paper. 
Definition of Variables 
The present analysis will include six dependent variables: three of incidence and three 
of intensity of training. All the variables considered in this study reflect responses about the 
firm’s training practices of the year previous to the interview.  The incidence variables are 
binary, taking the value one when the firm offers training, and zero when it does not.  The 
analysis of incidence of training refers to any training, including internal (in-firm) and 
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dependent or explanatory variables.   9
external (outside the firm), and to any type of worker.  The analysis for unskilled workers 
reflects the incidence of training for unskilled workers.  For external training the analysis 
refers to the provision of training from outside of the firm (as opposed to in-firm training).  
This last variable is intended as an approximation to the concept of general training 
described in training theory, as opposed to firm specific.  The relevance of general training is 
that, for being portable to other firms, it may have a higher potential to increase the wages of 
workers in the long term.     
  The intensity variables are used in this paper to analyze the proportion of workers 
trained.  Intensity of training refers to the proportion of workers trained in either internal or 
external training, and includes any type of worker.  Similarly, intensity of unskilled workers 
refers to the proportion of unskilled workers trained over the total amount of unskilled 
workers of the firm.  Intensity of external training refers to the proportion of workers trained 
by external providers over the total amount of workers in the firm.    
  Our main explanatory variable of interest, ISO certification status, is a binary variable 
defined as one if the firm is either ISO 9000 or ISO 14000 certified.  The reason for this is 
that while the surveys for Honduras and Nicaragua distinguish between ISO 9000 and ISO 
14000 certifications, the surveys for Indonesia and Morocco do not; here, a “composite” ISO 
question was used, that is, whether the firm had at least one of the certifications.  So as to 
ensure valid inference for the ISO variable, we include a host of explanatory variables in 
addition to ISO-certification status.  These variables include foreign ownership share and 
exporting share (exports as a share of total sales); firm size, based on the total number of full 
time employees; capital-labor ratio, defined as the ratio of net value of production assets 
(machinery and equipment) over the total amount of full time workers of the firm (original 
responses in local currency were standardized to 2003 USD (market prices)); unionization, 
defined as the proportion of unionized workers; sector, according to standard ISIC 
classification, revision 3 (classified into four groups: food, garments, textiles and other 
industries); education, expressed as the weighed average of years of education per 
establishment.  Missing observations is particularly a problem with the capital-labor ratio.  
So as to retain as many firms in the analyses as possible, we therefore impute missing 
observations on this variable with the sample mean of the country by industry.   10
Descriptive Analyses 
In order to get an initial grasp of the determinants of firm level training, training 
incidence for our three types of training across various firm characteristics are tabulated in 
Tables 3.2-3.4. 
 
Table 3.2   Training Incidence, any Training 
  Ethiopia HondurasIndonesiaMorocco Nicaragua
Full sample average  0.224 0.530 0.290 0.165  0.407
ISO Certification Status:       
No ISO certification  0.212 0.516 0.223 0.145  0.395
Has ISO certification  0.667 0.741 0.527 0.583  0.650
Education  (Average,  Years)     
< 6 yrs  0.153 0.406 0.169 0.122  0.250
6 to 12  0.187 0.548 0.255 0.177  0.419
12 and above  0.481 0.636 0.471 0.300  0.532
Firm size:       
1-15 employees  0.054 0.364 0.143 0.029  0.283
16-100 employees  0.289 0.620 0.148 0.113  0.546
101-250 employees  0.600 0.647 0.371 0.225  0.800
250+ employees  0.636 0.870 0.454 0.426  0.846
Unionization:       
Non-unionized firms  0.142 0.520 0.173 0.137  0.382
Unionized firms  0.541 0.846 0.395 0.349  0.759
K-L Ratio (2003 prices):       
Less than USD100   0.120 0.625 0.292 0.165  0.433
USD100 or more  0.231 0.526 0.200 0.250  0.405
Industry:       
Textiles 0.500 0.714 0.246 0.210  0.333
Garments 0.219 0.638 0.298 0.124  0.321
Food 0.271 0.540 0.298 0.158  0.613
Other 0.189 0.476 0.303 0.185  0.371
Foreign ownership:       
Less than 10 percent  0.212 0.495 0.254 0.120  0.377
10 percent or more  0.444 0.727 0.477 0.335  0.682
Exporting share:       
Less than 10 percent  0.201 0.454 0.222 0.142  0.397
10 percent or more  0.565 0.688 0.397 0.188  0.440
Number of Observations  362 434 677 799 445
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Considering Table 3.2 for the case of any training (as opposed to training for 
unskilled workers and training by external providers), it is clear that a large fraction of firms 
train.  Training incidences range from about 17 percent for Morocco to 53 percent for 
Honduras.   
Table 3.3   Training Incidence, Training of Unskilled Workers 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco  Nicaragua
Full sample average  0.086 0.224 0.109 0.039  0.139
ISO Certification Status:           
No ISO certification  0.085 0.221 0.074 0.031  0.134
Has ISO certification  0.111 0.259 0.236 0.194  0.250
Education (Average, Years)          
< 6 yrs  0.085 0.217 0.064 0.027  0.078
6 to 12  0.064 0.224 0.118 0.046  0.147
12 and above  0.192 0.227 0.154 0.025  0.170
Firm size:           
1-15 employees  0.024 0.120 0.000 0.010  0.079
16-100 employees  0.133 0.263 0.060 0.028  0.230
101-250 employees  0.233 0.324 0.067 0.047  0.267
250+ employees  0.182 0.463 0.193 0.099  0.154
Unionization:         
Non-unionized firms  0.069 0.221 0.068 0.033  0.125
Unionized firms  0.149 0.308 0.147 0.075  0.345
K-L Ratio (2003 prices):           
Less than USD100   0.080 0.250 0.112 0.039  0.100
USD100 or more  0.086 0.222 0.000 0.000  0.142
Industry:          
Textiles 0.250 0.429 0.109 0.038  0.067
Garments 0.094 0.300 0.066 0.020  0.107
Food 0.073 0.248 0.123 0.066  0.288
Other 0.081 0.172 0.128 0.055  0.109
Foreign ownership:           
Less than 10 percent  0.084 0.207 0.098 0.024  0.127
10 percent or more  0.111 0.318 0.168 0.096  0.250
Exporting share:           
Less than 10 percent  0.074 0.188 0.067 0.022  0.136
10 percent or more  0.261 0.298 0.176 0.055  0.150
Number of Observations  362 434 677 799 445
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There are, however, wide and systematic differences in training incidence related to 
firm characteristics.  Firms with ISO certification consistently are much more likely to 
provide training for workers than are firms that are not ISO certified.  The same is true for 
firms with a more educated workforce, firms that are unionized, exporting firms and firms 
with foreign ownership.  There is also a positive association between firm size and firm 
training.   
Table 3.4   Training Incidence, Training by External Providers 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco Nicaragua 
Full sample average  0.152 0.263 0.185 0.129  0.238
ISO  Certification  Status:       
No ISO certification  0.142 0.256 0.132 0.110  0.231
Has ISO certification  0.556 0.370 0.372 0.528  0.400
Education  (Average,  Years)       
< 6 yrs  0.051 0.203 0.084 0.092  0.156
6 to 12  0.131 0.271 0.168 0.139  0.234
12 and above  0.365 0.318 0.322 0.250  0.383
Firm  size:       
1-15 employees  0.024 0.129 0.000 0.029  0.125
16-100 employees  0.133 0.307 0.066 0.083  0.362
101-250 employees  0.467 0.500 0.326 0.201  0.600
250+ employees  0.568 0.519 0.297 0.307  0.692
Unionization:       
Non-unionized firms  0.076 0.259 0.099 0.104  0.214
Unionized firms  0.446 0.385 0.263 0.292  0.586
K-L  Ratio  (2003  prices):       
Less than USD100   0.080 0.313 0.184 0.128  0.200
USD100 or more  0.157 0.261 0.200 0.250  0.241
Industry:       
Textiles 0.167 0.500 0.188 0.177  0.200
Garments 0.125 0.363 0.205 0.084  0.071
Food 0.177 0.310 0.158 0.105  0.438
Other 0.144 0.189 0.182 0.155  0.218
Foreign  ownership:       
Less than 10 percent  0.142 0.223 0.165 0.093  0.209
10 percent or more  0.333 0.485 0.290 0.263  0.500
Exporting  share:       
Less than 10 percent  0.136 0.191 0.142 0.112  0.220
10 percent or more  0.391 0.411 0.252 0.146  0.300
Number of Observations  362 434 677 799 445
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Perhaps surprisingly the association between the capital-labor ratio and firm training 
is negative for some countries, indicating that capital and training are substitutes.  Lastly, 
there are large within-industry differences in firm training.  The results for training of 
unskilled workers and training by external providers are similar (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).   
We also present the proportion of workers trained for the three types of training 
across various firm characteristics (Tables B1-B3 in Appendix B).  The results are similar to 
the results for training incidence, although the positive bivariate relationship between share 
of workers trained and ISO certification status does not hold up quite as strongly as was the 
case for training incidence.  The sample averages here are quite low, however, leading to 
lower variation and therefore relatively more importance of outlier observations.   
4.  Methodology 
The theoretical framework of this paper is traditional human capital theory, which 
links individual and firm behavior for the understanding of firm-sponsored training (Becker, 
1964). Training is considered to be result of optimizing decisions made by both the worker 
and the employer for whom training represents an investment. Employers and workers will 
train if the net present value of training is positive. The expected rate of return of training 
depends on the cost, the investment horizon, the increase in productivity and the increase in 
wages. Employers will train their workers if they expect the subsequent productivity 
increments to be higher than an alternative investment with similar risks. Employees, on the 
other hand, will be willing to invest in training following the same logic under the 
expectation of future higher wages.  
  The model differentiates between firm-specific training, particular to the specific 
needs of the firm that hence cannot be exported, from general training, which is portable. If 
workers quit after obtaining general training, the firm is not able to reap the full benefits of 
its investment, thus this model predicts that firms will tend to sponsor only specific training. 
General training has especial prominence for economic development purposes due to its 
portability to other firms, which enables employees to generate returns later in their life. 
  An alternative model to explain firm’s willingness to provide general training has 
been presented by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999). The degree of wage compression 
will determine the share of training costs between employers and employees. The more   14
compressed the wage structure, often seen in situation in non-competitive labor markets, the 
higher the incentive for employers to provide training in order to reap the productivity gains 
that are not passed to employees in the form of higher wages. This theory seems to better 
explain the fact that employers do pay for substantial amounts of general training. On the 
other hand, it has particular relevance at an international policy making level because it 
suggests that differences in countries’ labor markets and institutional practices -such as wage 
setting, and firing and hiring regulations-, may significantly impact the extent to which 
private sector will become a provider of training at an optimal level (OECD, 1999).  
  Based on these considerations, we propose the following simple model of training 
determinants at the firm level: 
  Ti = T(ISOi, Oi),        (4.1) 
where T is a measure of training provision for firm i, ISO is ISO certification status of 
firm i and O is a vector containing other characteristics of firm I thought to influence the 
firm’s training decision.  The measure of training provision could be, for example, a binary 
measure of whether the firm trains at all or a measure of the amount of training provided, 
say, the number of hours of training provided or the number or fraction  of workers receiving 
training.  Moving to the explanatory variables, whether an enterprise is ISO certified or not is 
thought to affect training positively, since the standards prescribed by ISO would seem to 
require a higher quality of labor to ensure adherence.  One issue here, of course, is that ISO 
certification status is potentially endogenous.  In particular, firms may choose ISO and 
training simultaneously.  On the other hand, endogeneity might be due to reverse causality, 
with training of workers leading firms to become ISO certified as fewer errors are made.  
Since the nature of the data does not allow us to include an instrumental variable for ISO 
certification status that is, a variable that affects ISO certification status without at the same 
time affecting the firm’s training decision directly, however, in the analyses we have to 
merely treat ISO certification status (and the other explanatory variables) as predetermined.     
While ISO certification status is the factor in the firm’s training decision process that 
has our main interest, other factors may also be important.  A natural first candidate is the 
educational level of workers, which is thought to affect training positively.  The reason for 
this is that employees who have already shown some aptitude for learning new skills in terms   15
of formal schooling also would seem to be more likely to receive additional human capital 
investments from the employer in the form of training (Lynch and Black, 1995).  Whether a 
firm exports or not and how much is thought to affect the training decision positively; 
presumably the pressure from (Western) consumers on firms operating in foreign markets 
will force the firm to produce goods of a higher quality which in turn will require higher 
quality labor, as well.  Additionally, larger firms would seem to be more likely to train due to 
economies of scale.   
Contrary to what was the case for the previously discussed factors, it is not clear a 
priori in which direction the firm’s capital-labor ratio affects the firm’s training decision.  At 
one extreme, training may serve as a substitute to physical capital so that more capital 
intensive firms will train less and less capital intensive firms will train more.  At the other 
extreme, however, training may serve as a complement to physical capital so that more 
capital intensive firms will train more and less capital intensive firms will train less. 
  To allow the possibility of omitted individual heterogeneity due to the institutional 
frameworks and economic conditions and opportunities differing widely across countries, 
(4.1) is estimated separately across the five countries.  Estimations are carried out for both of 
the two different types of measures of training—binary measure, measuring whether the firm 
provides training or not and continuous measure, measuring the proportion of workers 
trained—and all three different types of training described in the previous section—any 
training, training of unskilled workers and training by external providers.   
The estimation of (4.1) for the case of the binary training measure will be carried out 
by estimation of univariate probit models.  Due to the possible censoring of training at zero 
or one censoring may be an issue for the second, continuous measure of traioning intensity.  
Specifically, OLS will, if censoring is present, lead to biased estimates.  To address this 
issue, these analyses will therefore be carried out by estimating tobit models, allowing for 
censoring both from below (at zero) and from above (at one).     16
5.  Results 
This section presents the results.  First, we review the results for the probit 
regressions of the binary training decision that is, whether to train or not.  In the subsequent 
sub-section follows the results for the tobit regressions of the continuous training decision 
that is, how much to train (in terms of the proportion of workers).  Descriptive statistics for 
the analyses samples are reported in Table A1, Appendix A. 
5.1  To Train or not to Train? 
We first look at the firm’s binary training decision that is, whether the firm trains any 
workers.  Starting with the results for any training (that is, not discriminating between 
whether the training was given to skilled or unskilled workers and/or provided internally or 
externally) there is a large effect from ISO certification status (Table 5.1).  The effect ranges 
from about 6 percentage-points for Honduras to about 26 percentage-points for Morocco.  
Although the impact is statistically significant only for Indonesia and Morocco, the impact is 
large in substantive terms for all countries, particularly Ethiopia, Indonesia, Morocco and 
Nicaragua, where it exceeds 15 percentage-points.  In turn, this indicates that ISO 
certification status is an important determinant of the firm’s training decision.  This 
corresponds to the results of Dowlatshahi and Urias (2004), which to our knowledge is the 
only study that examines the possible impact of ISO certification status on firm training.  
Again, as previously discussed, wile ISO certification status is potentially endogenous, we do 
not have readily available any instrumental variable(s).    
Education affects firm training positively with effects ranging between about 0.5 and 
about 5 percentage-points.  For Nicaragua, for example, each year of education is found to 
increase the probability of training with about 3  percentage-points, so that, on average, a 
worker with 5 years of education, say, is about 15 percentage points more likely to receive 
training that a worker with no education.  Larger firms are more likely to train workers than 
smaller firms.  The evidence for the capital-labor ratio, foreign ownership and exporting 
status is more mixed, with both negative and positive effects.     17
Table 5.1   Marginal Probabilities from Probit Regressions for any Training 
 Ethiopia  Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco  Nicaragua 
Log(number of employees)  0.098***  0.168***  0.074***  0.096***  0.155*** 
  [0.016]  [0.026] [0.016] [0.013]  [0.030] 
Education  (years)  0.006  0.054*** 0.017*** 0.005  0.031*** 
  [0.007]  [0.012] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.011] 
Capital-labor ratio (log)  0.017*  0.009  -0.006  0.029***  -0.021 
  [0.009]  [0.016] [0.011] [0.009]  [0.018] 
Foreign ownership share  -0.016  -0.206*  0.044  0.086***  0.17 
  [0.114]  [0.112] [0.056] [0.030]  [0.112] 
Exports share  0.148*  0.011  -0.002  -0.043  -0.144 
  [0.088]  [0.101] [0.051] [0.034]  [0.102] 
Unionization  0.023  0.167 0.052 0.063  0.105 
  [0.064]  [0.151] [0.047] [0.039]  [0.130] 
ISO certified  0.179  0.059  0.159***  0.263***  0.167 
  [0.154]  [0.111] [0.049] [0.080]  [0.144] 
Garments 0.093  -0.022  0.149**  -0.065**  -0.045 
  [0.165]  [0.160] [0.063] [0.031]  [0.147] 
Food 0.014  0.047  0.210***  -0.026  0.223 
  [0.118]  [0.156] [0.070] [0.041]  [0.145] 
Other industries  -0.028  -0.013  0.100*  0.014  0.028 
  [0.115]  [0.152] [0.051] [0.033]  [0.134] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.301  0.153 0.168 0.226  0.140 
Number of Observations  362  434  677  799  445 
Notes: ***: statistically significant at 1 percent; **: statistically significant at 5 percent; *: statistically 
significant at 10 percent.  Industry reference category is “Textiles”.  Numbers in brackets are robust Huber 
(1967)-White (1980) Sandwich standard errors.   
 
Perhaps surprisingly unionized firms are more likely to provide training, although the 
impact is imprecisely measured and so is not statistically significant.  One reason for 
expecting a negative impact is that unions, according to standard economic theory, are 
thought to generally reduce training by bargaining for higher wages and thereby reducing the 
ability of employers to lower wages to finance firm-specific training through an apprentice-
ship wage, say.  On the other hand, if unions have a longer time-horizon than management, 
they may be willing to trade off wage increases for increased training of workers.   
Turning to the results of training of unskilled workers, the results differ somewhat 
from the results for any training presented previously (Table 5.2).  Most notably, ISO 
certification status now has a negative impact for Ethiopia and Honduras.  For Indonesia, 
Morocco and Nicaragua, however, the impacts remain positive and large, between 3.6 and 
8.5 percentage-points.  The impact from education has decreased substantially but education 
still has a positive impact, except for Ethiopia, where it is close to zero.     18
In turn, this implies that the training of unskilled workers is much less responsive to 
the human capital stock of the workforce than is that of workers in general.  Unskilled 
workers, therefore, face a double jeopardy by both having low stocks of human capital (since 
they are unskilled/lowskilled in the first place) and also receiving relatively less training per 
year of schooling, relative to skilled workers. 
 
Table 5.2   Marginal Probabilities from Probit Regressions for Training of Unskilled Workers 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco Nicaragua 
Log(number of employees)  0.033*** 0.080***  0.021**  0.013*** 0.032* 
  [0.009]  [0.019] [0.009] [0.004]  [0.017] 
Education (years)  -0.003 0.014  0.005***  0.0001 0.010 
  [0.004]  [0.009] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.007] 
Capital-labor ratio (log)  0.007 0.018  -0.008  0.008***  0.003 
  [0.006]  [0.014] [0.006] [0.003]  [0.010] 
Foreign ownership share  -0.039  -0.038 -0.017 0.017*  0.056 
  [0.061]  [0.077] [0.034] [0.009]  [0.063] 
Exports share  0.084* -0.045  0.046  0.022* -0.052 
  [0.048]  [0.070] [0.029] [0.011]  [0.072] 
Unionization  -0.027 -0.049  0.005  0.0001 0.082 
  [0.030]  [0.098] [0.031] [0.011]  [0.085] 
ISO certified  -0.037 -0.052  0.085** 0.036  0.064 
  [0.036]  [0.070] [0.034] [0.028]  [0.092] 
Garments  0.010  -0.052 -0.023 -0.017  0.051 
  [0.077]  [0.097] [0.031] [0.011]  [0.132] 
Food  -0.034 -0.013  0.062  0.027  0.214 
  [0.049]  [0.106] [0.045] [0.031]  [0.165] 
Other industries  -0.036 -0.086  0.027  0.022  0.045 
  [0.066]  [0.105] [0.030] [0.016]  [0.092] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.137  0.082 0.114 0.188  0.091 
Number of Observations  362  434 677 799  445 
Notes: ***: statistically significant at 1 percent; **: statistically significant at 5 percent; *: statistically 
significant at 10 percent.  Industry reference category is “Textiles”.  Numbers in brackets are robust 
Huber (1967)-White (1980) Sandwich standard errors.   
 
Moving to the results for external training, the negative impact from ISO certification 
status is seen to persist for Honduras, although it is imprecisely measured and therefore not 
statistically significant (Table 5.3).  For the other countries in the primary analysis sample the 
impact remains positive and large, ranging from about 8 percentage points for Nicaragua to 
about 22 percentage-points for Morocco.  The estimate for average years of education is now 
up a bit compared to what was the case for unskilled workers, ranging between 0.5 and 3 
percentage-points.       19
         Table 5.3   Marginal Probabilities from Probit Regressions for Training by External Providers 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco Nicaragua 
Log(number of employees)  0.057***  0.116*** 0.068*** 0.067***  0.126*** 
  [0.011]  [0.020] [0.012] [0.010]  [0.022] 
Education (years)  0.012***  0.030*** 0.013*** 0.005**  0.013 
  [0.004]  [0.009] [0.002] [0.003]  [0.009] 
Capital-labor ratio (log)  0.009*  0.007 0.006 0.027***  -0.007 
  [0.005]  [0.014] [0.009] [0.007]  [0.015] 
Foreign ownership share  -0.006  -0.002 -0.001 0.056**  0.140* 
  [0.052]  [0.083] [0.044] [0.023]  [0.077] 
Exports share  0.028  -0.021 -0.059 -0.028  -0.151* 
  [0.050]  [0.074] [0.040] [0.027]  [0.084] 
Unionization  0.032 -0.095  0.009  0.058*  0.040 
  [0.042]  [0.090] [0.036] [0.034]  [0.085] 
ISO certified  0.094 -0.048  0.106***  0.224***  0.078 
  [0.125]  [0.072] [0.041] [0.075]  [0.119] 
Garments  0.307 -0.076  0.099*  -0.057**  -0.187*** 
  [0.213]  [0.107] [0.051] [0.025]  [0.059] 
Food  0.148  0.052 0.077 -0.049**  0.143 
  [0.116]  [0.127] [0.058] [0.022]  [0.140] 
Other industries  0.112** -0.078  0.031  0.007  0.010 
  [0.056]  [0.119] [0.038] [0.026]  [0.108] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.385  0.149 0.185 0.244  0.185 
Number of Observations  362  434 677 799  445 
Notes: ***: statistically significant at 1 percent; **: statistically significant at 5 percent; *:  
statistically significant at 10 percent.  Industry reference category is “Textiles”.  Numbers in  
brackets are robust Huber (1967)-White (1980) Sandwich standard errors.   
 
5.2  Determinants of how much to Train 
The analysis of the previous subsection examined the firm’s binary training decision 
that is, whether to train at all.  While this is interesting in its own right, examining the degree 
to which firms train that is, how much training is provided, will potentially shed additional 
light on the relationship between international standards and training.  Results from the tobit 
regressions for the percentage of workers trained overall are provided in Table 5.4.  The main 
impression from the table is that ISO certification again has a large positive impact, 
supporting the earlier findings for any training.  Only for Honduras is this not the case; the 
impact estimate is imprecisely measured here, however, and therefore not statistically 
significant.  Education has a positive and statistically significant impact for all countries, 
except for Ethiopia.  Unionization has a positive impact on the proportion of workers trained, 
although it is not statistically significant. 
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Table 5.4   Coefficients from Tobit Regressions of Training Intensity, any Training 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco Nicaragua 
Log(number of employees)  0.115*** 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.161*** 0.147*** 
  [0.027] [0.032] [0.023] [0.027] [0.042] 
Education (years)  0.006  0.055*** 0.023*** 0.013*  0.055*** 
  [0.010] [0.016] [0.005] [0.008] [0.015] 
Capital-labor ratio (log)  0.023 0.023 -0.011  0.068***  -0.027 
  [0.017] [0.022] [0.017] [0.020] [0.025] 
Foreign ownership share  0.155 -0.081  0.060 0.202***  0.151 
  [0.170] [0.138] [0.079] [0.064] [0.152] 
Exports share  0.154 0.062 0.020 -0.047  -0.202 
  [0.141] [0.124] [0.071] [0.066] [0.147] 
Unionization  0.013 -0.018  0.094 0.032 -0.006 
  [0.096] [0.193] [0.067] [0.064] [0.153] 
ISO certified  0.037  -0.060  0.231*** 0.327*** 0.215 
  [0.171] [0.137] [0.063] [0.088] [0.168] 
Garments  0.064 -0.107  0.151*  -0.162**  -0.074 
  [0.194] [0.200] [0.084] [0.068] [0.239] 
Food  0.018  -0.103 0.225**  -0.027 0.375 
  [0.166] [0.198] [0.089] [0.094] [0.230] 
Other industries  -0.078 -0.205 0.164**  0.045  0.078 
  [0.161] [0.193] [0.074] [0.065] [0.217] 
Constant  -0.955*** -0.755**  -1.220*** -1.313*** -1.008*** 
  [0.261] [0.321] [0.143] [0.158] [0.311] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.203 0.046 0.162 0.238 0.078 
Number of Observations  362 434 677 799 445 
Notes: ***: statistically significant at 1 percent; **: statistically significant at 5 percent; *: statistically 
significant at 10 percent.  Reference categories are “Textiles”.  The estimations take into account censoring 
from below (at zero) and from above (at one).   
 
The results for training intensity for unskilled workers and training by external 
providers (Tables 5.5 and 5.6) are similar to those of any training intensity.  One issue here, 
however, is that the average proportion of trained workers across firms are quite low for 
unskilled workers and training by outside providers (see Table A1, Appendix A), which in 
turn leads to relatively little variation in these variables.  These results should therefore be 
treated with special caution and are mainly included here for comprehensiveness. 
Summing up, the results indicate that the five countries in our analysis sample have 
distinctly different experiences as far as the determinants of training are concerned.  Further, 
international standards as proxied by ISO certification status proved important overall as a 
major determinant of firms’ decisions to train their workers.  Other aspects of globalization 
such as foreign ownership and exporting share proved important, as well, although the 
pattern was less consistent than what was the case for ISO.  Lastly, human capital in terms of   21
formal education appear to be complements to training so that firms with a higher stock of 
worker human capital also will train more.  This was true both for the average worker, as 
well as for unskilled workers. 
 
Table 5.5   Coefficients from Tobit Regressions of Training Intensity, Unskilled Workers 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco  Nicaragua 
Log(number of employees)  0.098** 0.117***  0.060*  0.183*** 0.079 
  [0.038]  [0.042] [0.031] [0.062] [0.063] 
Education (years)  -0.010 0.016  0.017** -0.007  0.038* 
  [0.014]  [0.020] [0.007] [0.020] [0.023] 
Capital-labor ratio (log)  0.025 0.061** -0.039  0.102* 0.005 
  [0.025]  [0.029] [0.024] [0.052] [0.037] 
Foreign ownership share  -0.083  0.071 0.018 0.272*  0.173 
  [0.258]  [0.170] [0.109] [0.142] [0.218] 
Exports share  0.229 -0.061  0.154  0.296* -0.153 
  [0.187]  [0.159] [0.100] [0.159] [0.219] 
Unionization  -0.080 -0.090  0.040  -0.061  0.202 
  [0.136]  [0.251] [0.092] [0.150] [0.214] 
ISO certified  -0.137 -0.182  0.269***  0.301*  0.160 
  [0.275]  [0.186] [0.087] [0.182] [0.240] 
Garments  0.030  -0.095 -0.089 -0.258 0.286 
  [0.252]  [0.236] [0.124] [0.172] [0.423] 
Food  -0.063 -0.061  0.123  0.307  0.666 
  [0.216]  [0.235] [0.122] [0.194] [0.411] 
Other industries  -0.132 -0.200  0.102  0.207  0.206 
  [0.207]  [0.229] [0.101] [0.156] [0.397] 
Constant -
0.970***  -1.359*** -1.335*** -2.230*** -1.769*** 
  [0.368]  [0.424] [0.219] [0.480] [0.556] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.108  0.058 0.141 0.200 0.075 
Number of Observations  362  434  677  799  445 
Notes: ***: statistically significant at 1 percent; **: statistically significant at 5 percent; *: statistically 
significant at 10 percent.  Reference categories are “Textiles”.  The estimations take into account censoring 
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Table 5.6   Coefficients from Tobit Regressions of Training Intensity, Training by External 
Providers 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco  Nicaragua 
Log(number of employees)  0.034*** 0.085*** 0.031*** 0.061***  0.086*** 
  [0.008] [0.024] [0.006] [0.012]  [0.024] 
Education (years)  0.008**  0.034*** 0.006*** 0.008**  0.018** 
  [0.003] [0.012] [0.001] [0.003]  [0.008] 
Capital-labor ratio (log)  0.004 0.019 0.0001  0.033***  -0.007 
  [0.004] [0.016] [0.004] [0.009]  [0.014] 
Foreign ownership share  0.038 -0.015  0.010 0.066**  0.068 
  [0.043] [0.094] [0.020] [0.028]  [0.083] 
Exports share  0.015 -0.023  -0.069***  -0.043  -0.087 
  [0.036] [0.087] [0.019] [0.030]  [0.085] 
Unionization  0.023 -0.041  0.008 0.034  -0.003 
  [0.025] [0.138] [0.018] [0.028]  [0.083] 
ISO certified  0.022 -0.102  0.041**  0.149***  0.066 
  [0.042] [0.101] [0.016] [0.037]  [0.095] 
Garments  0.104* 0.030  0.063***  -0.058*  -0.300* 
  [0.061] [0.132] [0.022] [0.030]  [0.153] 
Food  0.070 0.053 0.046*  -0.069  0.148 
  [0.054] [0.132] [0.023] [0.045]  [0.128] 
Other industries  0.095* -0.042 0.043**  0.026  0.01 
  [0.052] [0.128] [0.019] [0.028]  [0.122] 
Constant 
-0.437*** -0.981*** -0.360*** 
-
0.562*** -0.618*** 
  [0.089] [0.239] [0.042] [0.072]  [0.177] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.825 0.096 0.471 0.425  0.163 
Number  of  Observations  362 434 677 799  445 
Notes: ***: statistically significant at 1 percent; **: statistically significant at 5 percent; *: statistically 
significant at 10 percent.  Reference categories are “Textiles”.  The estimations take into account censoring 
from below (at zero) and from above (at one).   
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
While several previous studies have examined what matters in the firm’s decision to 
train its workers (Lynch and Black, 1995; Tan and Batra, 1995; Tan and Lopez-Acevedo, 
2003) few, if any, of these studies have looked specifically at international product and 
management standards as a potential important factor influencing the firm’s training 
decision.     
  This paper examines training determinants using recent employer surveys for five 
developing countries across the continents.  In so doing, we emphasize the potential impact 
from international product and management standards but also include other potentially   23
important determinants of firm training.  Among the major findings are that ISO certification 
is an important determinant of firm training, both in statistical and substantive terms.       
  While the endogenity of ISO certification may be an issue, this has potentially 
important policy implications.  First, globalization (which is one aspect of international 
product and management standards) is not necessarily a “bad thing” as far as training of the 
workforce is concerned.  Further, another aspect of globalization, namely foreign ownership, 
is found to also promote training, as is also firms’ exporting share.  Second, demanding 
international standards, for example ISO, to be adhered to by firms may not necessarily 
decrease the firm’s investments in human capital in terms of training accordingly.  On the 
contrary, the demands of international standards such as the ISO will likely require firms to 
increase the technical capabilities of their workers, as these standards will require higher and 
more consistent quality of production and management.  Third, in this process unions may 
play a role, as well.  Although the evidence here is much weaker, it does, however, raise the 
issue of the labor unions being potentially important players in terms of upgrading the skills 
of the work force in developing countries.  Fourth, the results hint at the potential importance 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for the firm’s training decision.  While CSR is a 
fuzzy concept, the understanding adopted here is that CSR measures values such as 
environmental or “green” production and consumption, on the producer and consumer side, 
respectively.  With this definition, CSR is to some extent captured by the components 
inherent in the ISO 14000 definition.  In turn, CSR therefore potentially accounts for a 
substantial fraction of the variation in firm provided training.  
  While this study shed additional light on the determinants of the firm’s decision to 
train its workforce, especially as this relates to the potential importance of international 
product and management standards and CSR, more research is needed.  In particular, the 
quest to learn more about what determines the firm’s training decision is severely limited by 
data constraints, especially as far as the CSR component is concerned.  In particular, while 
we have argued that several of our variables capture elements of CSR it is hard to define 
exactly what CSR is.  Future work on the linkages between training and CSR would benefit 
tremendously from incorporating questions more related to values into future surveys.  For 
example, it would be useful to know about management’s attitudes towards consumer values 
more broadly, their willingness to adapt to these and the weight they apply to these values as   24
well as the other aspects of CSR.  Admittedly, it may be difficult to obtain truthful answers to 
these questions so that we are, once again, stuck with whatever proxies we can find in 
existing firm surveys.   25
References 
 
Acemoglu, D. and J.S. Pischke (1998) “The Structure of Wages and Investment in 
General Training”, Working Paper 6357, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
Acemoglu, D. and J.S. Pischke (1999) “Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor 
Markets”, Economic Journal, 109(453): 112-142.  
 
Aidt, Toke and Zafiris Tzannatos (2002) Unions and Collective Bargaining, 
Washington D.C.: World Bank 
 
Arulampalam, Wiji and Alison Booth (1997) “Who Gets Over the Training Hurdle? A 
study of the training experiences of young men and women in Britain”, Journal of 
Population Economics, 10(2):197-217. 
 
Bartel, Ann and Nachum Sicherman (1998) “Technological Change and the Skill 
Acquisition of Young Workers”, Journal of Labor Economics, 16(4): 718-755. 
Becker, Gary S. (1964) Human Capital, New York: National Bureau of Economic  
Research. 
 
Berthelot, S., McGraw M.C., and Morril, J. (2003) “ISO 14000: Added Value for 
Canadian Business?”, Environmental Quality Management, 13(2): 47-57. 
 
Blomstrom, Magnus and Ari Kokko (2001) “FDI and Human Capital: A Research 
Agenda”, OECD Technical Meeting, 13-14 December, Paris.    
 
Booth, Alison (1991) “Job-related Formal Training: Who Receives It and What is It 
Worth?”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 53(3): 281-294. 
 
________(1993) “Private Sector Training and Graduate Earnings”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 75(1):164-170. 
 
________ (1995) The Economics of the Trade Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Booth, Alison and Dennis Snower (1996) “Acquiring Skills, Market Failures, Their 
Symptoms and Policy Responses”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Colin Xu, Lixin (1998) “A Survey of Firm-Level Surveys of World Bank”, World Bank  
  Working Paper, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Corbett, C., Montes, M., and Alvarez-Gil, M.J., (2002), “Does ISO 9000 Certification  
Pay?”, ISO Management Systems.  Special Report, July-August Issue: 31-40. 
   26
Dowlatshahi, Shad and Cristina Urias (2004) “An Empirical Study of ISO Certification 
in the Maquiladora Industry”, International Journal of Production Economics, 88: 
291-306. 
 
Felstead, A. and F. Green (1996) “Training and the Business Cycle”, in A. Booth and D. 
Snower (eds.), Acquiring Skills, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Frazis, H., D. Herz, and M. Horrigan (1995) “Employer-provided Training: Results 
From a New Survey”, Monthly Labor Review, 118(5): 3-17. 
 
Freeman, R. B., and J.L. Medoff (1984) What Do Unions Do?, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Goux, Dominique and Eric Maurin (2000) “Returns to Firm-provided Training: 
Evidence from French Worker-firm Matched data”, Labour Economics, 7(1):1- 
19. 
Green, Francis (1993) “The Determinants of Training of Male and Female Employees in 
Britain”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 55(1): 103-122. 
 
Green, F., S. Machin, and D. Wilkinson (1996) “Trade Unions and Training Practices 
in British Workplaces”, Discussion Paper No 278, Centre for Economic Performance. 
 
Huber, P. J. (1967) ”The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under Nonstandard 
Conditions”, In: Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical 
Statistics and Probability Vol. 1, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
 
Lillard, Lee, and Hong Tan (1992) “Private Sector Training: Who Gets it and What are 
its Effects?” in Ronald Ehrenberg (ed.), Research in Labor Economics, 13, 
Greenwich, Conn. and London: JAI Press. 
 
Lynch, Lisa M. and Sandra E. Black (1995) “Beyond the Incidence of Training: Evidence  
from a National Employer Survey”, NBER Working Paper No. 5231, New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Mincer, Jacob (1974) Schooling, Experience and Earnings, New York: National Bureau  
of Economic Research. 
 
Ng, Ying Chu (2005) “Training Determinants and Productivity Impact of Training in 
China: a Case of Shanghai”, Economics of Education Review, forthcoming. 
 
Ofori, G., Gang, G., and Briffett, C., (2002) “Implementing Environmental Management 
Systems in Construction: Lessons from Quality Systems”, Building and Environment, 
37:1397-1407. 
 
Oi, Walter (1983) “Heterogeneous Firms and the Organization of Production” Economic 
Inquiry, 21(2):147-171. 
OECD (1999), “OECD Employment Outlook 1999 - Giving youth a better start”, Paris.   27
Romer, Paul (1989) “Human Capital and Growth: Theory and Evidence”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 3173. 
 
Smith, Adam (1776) “The Wealth of Nations”. 
 
Snower, Dennis (1996) “The Low-Skill, Bad-Job Trap”, in A. Booth and D. Snower  
(eds.), “Acquiring Skills”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tan, Hong (2001) “Do Training Levies Work? Malaysia’s HRDF and its Effects on 
Training and Firm-level Productivity”, World Bank Working Paper, Washington 
D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Tan, Hong and Geeta Batra (1995) “Enterprise Training in Developing Countries:  
Overview of Incidence, Determinants, and Productivity Outcomes”, Private Sector 
Development Department, Occasional Paper No. 9, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Tan, Hong and Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (2003) “Mexico: In-Firm Training for the  
Knowledge Economy”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2957, 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Van Smoorenburg, M.S.M. and R.K.W. Van der Velden (2000) “The Training of 
School-leavers: Complementarity or Substitution?” Economics of Education Review, 
19(2):207-217 
 
Veum, Jonathan (1995) “Sources of Training and their Impact on Wages”, Industrial and  
Labor Relations Review, 48(4): 812-826. 
 
White, H. (1980) “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a  
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity”, Econometrica, 48: 817–830.  
 
Zeufack, Albert (1998) “Explaining Employer-provided Training Incidence and Intensity 
in Thai Manufacturing Firms”, Mimeo, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
 
 APPENDIX A: Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Samples 
 
Table A1  Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Samples 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia Morocco Nicaragua 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
Any training  0.224 0.417 0.530 0.500 0.290 0.454 0.165 0.372 0.407 0.492
Unskilled training  0.086 0.280 0.224 0.417 0.109 0.312 0.039 0.193 0.139 0.347
External training  0.152 0.359 0.263 0.441 0.185 0.388 0.129 0.335 0.238 0.426
Any training, proportion trained  0.047 0.154 0.243 0.333 0.082 0.215 0.036 0.141 0.170 0.292
Unskilled training, proportion trained 0.017 0.082 0.085 0.214 0.028 0.127 0.011 0.076 0.052 0.170
External training, proportion trained  0.008 0.031 0.047 0.146 0.011 0.040 0.012 0.054 0.046 0.122
Log(total number of employees)  2.874 1.841 3.268 1.570 5.025 1.657 4.088 1.164 2.761 1.118
Education (years)  9.051 3.319 8.206 2.276 7.521 5.623 7.313 3.164 8.854 2.586
Capital-Labor Ratio (log)  7.076 2.434 7.464 1.539 0.256 1.563 0.856 1.547 7.012 1.569
Foreign ownership  0.035 0.165 0.135 0.329 0.138 0.327 0.164 0.343 0.082 0.259
Exporting enterprise  0.049 0.199 0.236 0.391 0.295 0.413 0.436 0.472 0.139 0.297
Unionization 0.204 0.404 0.030 0.171 0.523 0.500 0.133 0.339 0.065 0.247
ISO certification status   0.025 0.156 0.062 0.242 0.219 0.414 0.045 0.208 0.045 0.207
Textiles 0.033 0.179 0.032 0.177 0.204 0.403 0.233 0.423 0.034 0.181
Garments 0.088 0.284 0.184 0.388 0.223 0.417 0.374 0.484 0.126 0.332
Food 0.265 0.442 0.260 0.439 0.168 0.374 0.095 0.294 0.180 0.384
Other 0.613 0.488 0.523 0.500 0.405 0.491 0.298 0.458 0.661 0.474




 APPENDIX B: Training Intensity across various Firm Characteristics 
 
 
Table B1   Training Intensity, any Training 
  Ethiopia Honduras  Indonesia  Morocco Nicaragua 
Full sample average  0.047 0.243 0.082 0.036  0.170
ISO  Certification  Status:        
No ISO certification  0.047 0.242 0.053 0.028  0.166
Has ISO certification  0.046 0.247 0.188 0.202  0.261
Education  (Average,  Years)        
< 6 yrs  0.044 0.174 0.038 0.025  0.083
6 to 12  0.036 0.253 0.078 0.034  0.173
12 and above  0.103 0.301 0.139 0.119  0.270
Firm  size:        
1-15 employees  0.023 0.217 0.013 0.006  0.133
16-100 employees  0.079 0.259 0.034 0.034  0.225
101-250 employees  0.056 0.241 0.070 0.031  0.191
250+ employees  0.091 0.299 0.153 0.080  0.255
Unionization:        
Non-unionized firms  0.038 0.243 0.043 0.033  0.166
Unionized firms  0.082 0.222 0.118 0.057  0.222
K-L  Ratio  (2003  prices):        
Less than USD100   0.015 0.322 0.082 0.036  0.226
USD100 or more  0.049 0.239 0.083 0.038  0.166
Industry:        
Textiles 0.108 0.390 0.064 0.045  0.128
Garments 0.044 0.291 0.064 0.014  0.109
Food 0.064 0.253 0.069 0.044  0.283
Other 0.036 0.211 0.107 0.053  0.153
Foreign  ownership:       
Less than 10 percent  0.042 0.236 0.066 0.020  0.163
10 percent or more  0.136 0.279 0.170 0.096  0.230
Exporting  share:        
Less than 10 percent  0.044 0.225 0.051 0.033  0.176
10 percent or more  0.086 0.280 0.132 0.038  0.149
Number of Observations  362 434 677 799 445
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Table B2   Training Intensity, Training of Unskilled Workers 
 Ethiopia  Honduras Indonesia Morocco  Nicaragua
Full sample average  0.017 0.085 0.028 0.011  0.052
ISO  Certification  Status:        
No ISO certification  0.017 0.088 0.013 0.009  0.050
Has ISO certification  0.021 0.047 0.082 0.062  0.083
Education  (Average,  Years)        
< 6 yrs  0.018 0.099 0.006 0.016  0.020
6 to 12  0.013 0.082 0.033 0.009  0.058
12 and above  0.033 0.086 0.048 0.010  0.046
Firm  size:        
1-15 employees  0.012 0.059 0.000 0.004  0.037
16-100 employees  0.022 0.094 0.011 0.008  0.080
101-250 employees  0.019 0.107 0.006 0.009  0.011
250+ employees  0.028 0.150 0.059 0.037  0.060
Unionization:        
Non-unionized firms  0.015 0.085 0.014 0.011  0.049
Unionized firms  0.025 0.088 0.041 0.013  0.094
K-L  Ratio  (2003  prices):        
Less than USD100   0.011 0.051 0.029 0.011  0.046
USD100 or more  0.017 0.087 0.000 0.000  0.052
Industry:        
Textiles 0.031 0.179 0.026 0.013  0.012
Garments 0.016 0.123 0.014 0.007  0.054
Food 0.032 0.083 0.014 0.029  0.120
Other 0.010 0.067 0.043 0.010  0.034
Foreign  ownership:        
Less than 10 percent  0.016 0.075 0.019 0.005  0.049
10 percent or more  0.031 0.141 0.075 0.035  0.073
Exporting  share:        
Less than 10 percent  0.017 0.074 0.013 0.005  0.050
10 percent or more  0.020 0.108 0.052 0.017  0.055
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Table B3   Training Intensity, Training by External Providers 
  Ethiopia Honduras Indonesia Morocco  Nicaragua
Full sample average  0.008 0.047 0.011 0.012  0.046
ISO  Certification  Status:        
No ISO certification  0.008 0.048 0.009 0.008  0.045
Has ISO certification  0.013 0.030 0.020 0.085  0.064
Education  (Average,  Years)        
< 6 yrs  0.002 0.028 0.004 0.003  0.017
6 to 12  0.008 0.048 0.009 0.015  0.047
12 and above  0.016 0.094 0.021 0.032  0.078
Firm  size:        
1-15 employees  0.004 0.041 0.000 0.003  0.037
16-100 employees  0.007 0.062 0.005 0.012  0.060
101-250 employees  0.029 0.028 0.031 0.011  0.036
250+ employees  0.015 0.045 0.013 0.019  0.081
Unionization:        
Non-unionized firms  0.005 0.047 0.008 0.010  0.045
Unionized firms  0.019 0.066 0.014 0.022  0.061
K-L  Ratio  (2003  prices):        
Less than USD100   0.003 0.052 0.011 0.011  0.051
USD100 or more  0.008 0.047 0.002 0.038  0.046
Industry:        
Textiles 0.002 0.047 0.003 0.012  0.041
Garments 0.007 0.074 0.014 0.003  0.003
Food 0.006 0.042 0.008 0.008  0.091
Other 0.009 0.041 0.014 0.023  0.042
Foreign  ownership:        
Less than 10 percent  0.007 0.045 0.010 0.007  0.045
10 percent or more  0.028 0.061 0.018 0.029  0.051
Exporting  share:        
Less than 10 percent  0.007 0.042 0.014 0.015  0.046
10 percent or more  0.016 0.058 0.006 0.009  0.045
Number of Observations  362 434 677 799 445
 